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1. Introduction 
 
Since the seminal papers by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono 
(1987), who established the excess entry theorem (hereafter, the theorem), there have 
been many studies that have generalized the theorem in various ways and extended it to 
industrial policies. Following the review paper by Suzumura (2012), Kagitani et al. 
(2016) also examined the theorem in the case of horizontally differentiated oligopoly, 
based on the linear demand of the Shubik and Levitan (1989) model. 
   In this note, we reconsider the theorem under Cournot oligopoly with network 
externalities. Currently, many firms are entering information and communications 
industries, such as telecommunications and Internet services, and are facing strong 
competition in these markets in which the products and services are associated with 
network externalities and compatibilities. Thus, we examine whether the effect of entry 
into such a network goods market is socially efficient. That is, we demonstrate that a 
social under-entry arises if the strength of a network externality is greater than a half. 
This result may support entry promotion and competition policy in the market. 
   In considering the problem, we focus on the behavior of consumer expectations of 
network sizes in a network goods market. That is, following the definitions by Hurkens 
and López (2014, p. 1007), responsive expectations means that firms first compete in 
quantities (or in prices), then consumers form expectations about network sizes and 
finally consumers make optimal purchasing decisions, given the prices and their 
expectations. However, passive expectations means that consumers first form 
expectations about network sizes and then compete in quantities (or in prices); finally, 
consumers make optimal purchasing decisions, given their expectations. These 
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decisions then lead to the determination of actual market shares and network sizes. Thus, 
in equilibrium, realized and expected network sizes are the same (see Katz and Shapiro, 
1985).1 As mentioned below, however, differences in the consumer expectations do not 
change our main results. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1 Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium under passive expectations 
We consider a Cournot oligopoly in a homogeneous product market with network 
externalities. 2  We assume that a representative consumer in the market has the 
following utility function: 
  ,21 02 qQSFQaQu E    
n
i
iqQ
1
, ,,...,1, ni   
where a  is the intrinsic market size, 0q  the amount of consumption of a numeraire 
product, Q  the total amount of consumption of a homogeneous product associated 
with network externalities, iq  is the output of firm i, and )2(n  is the number of 
firms in the market.  ESF  denotes the network externality function where ES  
represents the expected network size. We also assume the following linear network 
                                                 
1 For example, in the case of price competition, consumers realize and expect that when 
one firm lowers its price it will increase its market share and become the larger network. 
That is, consumers must adjust their expectations in response to a price change. It is 
presumed that given these changed expectations, optimal purchasing decisions will 
cause expected and realized network sizes be equal. Thus, for all prices, expectations 
are required to be self-fulfilling. 
2 We also assume that the homogeneous product is perfectly compatible. 
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externality function, i.e.,   ,EE SSF   where  1,0  is the strength of a network 
externality. The budget constraint is ,0qPQy   ,10 p  where income y  and price 
P  are given for a representative consumer. Furthermore, we assume that the expected 
network size ES  is also given for a representative consumer, because the decision of 
each individual consumer does not affect the expected network sizes in the market. 
Under these conditions, a representative consumer maximizes his/her utility with 
respect to the amount of consumption. The first-order condition (FOC) is given by: 
  .0 PSFQaQu E  
Thus, we derive the following inverse demand functions3: 
 ,ESFQaP   


n
i
iqQ
1
, .,...,1, ni                             (1) 
Furthermore, to simplify the analysis, we assume that production costs are zero because 
we observe low and even negligible marginal running costs in a network industry. Thus, 
the profit function of firm i is    .iEii qSFQaPq   
   Under passive expectations, when deciding their output, each firm takes ES  and 
thus  ESF  as given. The FOC of profit maximization is given by: 
  ,0

iEi
i
i qSFQaqP
q
  .,...,1 ni                       (2) 
Based on equation (2), in a fulfilled expected and symmetric equilibrium, i.e., QS E 
and ,pii qqq   ,,,...,1, iinii   we derive the following equilibrium output per 
firm. 
                                                 
3 See equation (1) of Economides (1996). 
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,1)1(  n
aq p                                                (3) 
where superscript p denotes passive expectations. Using equations (2) and (3), 
equilibrium profit is given by: 
  .1)1(
22




 n
aq pp                                       (4) 
 
2.2 Responsive expectations 
We assume that consumers form expectations of network size after firms’ output 
decisions.4 As mentioned in the Introduction, this implies that the firms can commit to 
their output levels, so that consumers believe the output levels and then, based on these 
active beliefs, form expectations about the network size, i.e., .QS E   Thus, the 
inverse demand function is changed as follows: 
  ,1 QaP   


n
i
iqQ
1
, .,...,1, ni                               (5) 
   By following the same procedure as in Section 2.1, we derive the following 
equilibrium output and profit per firm: 
,)1)(1(  n
aqr                                              (6) 
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where superscript r denotes responsive expectations. 
 
2.3 Comparison: The role of consumers’ expectations 
                                                 
4 See Appendix of Katz and Shapiro (1985). 
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For a given number of firms in the short-run, we compare the equilibrium output and 
profit under passive and responsive expectations. 
   Using equations (3) and (6), we derive pr qq   and thus .pr QQ   This result 
implies that, regarding consumer surplus, ,pr CSCS   where   ,2
2k
k QCS   ., rpk 
That is, the firm outputs, total output, and consumer surplus under responsive 
expectations are larger than those under passive expectations. This is because under 
responsive expectations, where firms can commit to their output levels in advance, 
firms have incentives to increase their output levels compared with under passive 
expectations. Thus, competition is more intense under responsive expectations 
compared with under passive expectations. Accordingly, output, total output, and thus, 
consumer surplus under responsive expectations are larger than those under passive 
expectations. 
   Furthermore, using equations (4) and (7), with respect to the profits, we derive the 
following relationship: 
,)(1
1)( npr 
 
                                     (8) 
Given )2(n  and using equation (8), we obtain the following result. If ,14
3   
then it holds that .)(1
1)( npr 
 
  Otherwise, i.e., ,4
30   then it 
holds that .pr    That is, if the strength of network externalities is sufficiently large, 
the profit under responsive expectations is larger than that under passive expectations. 
Conversely, if the strength is small, the reverse is true. In other words, unless either the 
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strength of network externalities is significantly large, or unless the number of firms is 
small, competition is severe and thus the profit is lower under responsive expectations 
than under passive expectations. 
 
 
3. Free Entry and Excess Entry Theorem In the presence of Network Externalities 
 
3.1 Free entry equilibrium under passive and responsive expectations 
Before considering the theorem, we examine the long-run equilibrium with free entry 
where the zero-profit condition arises. We assume that the entry cost per firm is .0g  
The zero-profit condition can be expressed as: ,0 gk  ., rpk   Thus, using 
equations (4) and (7), with respect to the cases of passive and responsive expectations, 
we obtain the number of firms under free entry as follows. 
,)1( g
gan p 
                                               (9) 
,)1(
)1(
g
ga
nr 


                                           (10) 
where we assume .ga   In this case, by assuming that the number of firms in the 
case of non-network externalities, i.e., ,0  is given by ,20 
g
gan  and based 
on equations (9) and (10), it holds that .rp nn   That is, the number of firms under 
passive expectations is larger than that under responsive expectations. This is because 
firms have an incentive to increase their output more under responsive expectations, 
compared with under passive expectations, and thus competition is stronger. 
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Consequently, the incentive to enter into a market where consumers have responsive 
expectations is weak for firms, compared with a market where consumers have passive 
expectations. 
Furthermore, regarding the output and total output levels in the long-run, it also 
holds that rfpf qggq  1  and ,1
)1(
1
r
f
p
f Q
gagaQ 

 

  where 
subscript f denotes free entry. Thus, in the case of free entry in the long-run, outputs, 
total outputs, and thus consumer surplus under responsive expectations are larger than 
those under passive expectations. This result is similar to that in the case of the 
short-run, given the number of firms. 
 
3.2 The Excess Entry Theorem reconsidered 
We next examine the theorem in the second-best criteria. Considering an entry cost, 
social welfare can be expressed as: 
    ,2)(,
2
gnQngPSCSnqnWW k
k
kkkk    ., rpk   
Thus, we define the second-best socially optimal number of firms as follows: 
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In this case, with respect to the cases of passive and responsive expectations, we 
respectively consider whether free entry is excess or not, compared with the second-best 
socially optimal number of firms. 
First, let us examine the case of passive expectations. Using equations (3), (4), (11), 
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and a zero-profit condition, we obtain   .1)1(
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 Thus, we 
obtain the following relationship. 
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   Second, by a similar procedure in the case of responsive expectations, we can derive 
the following relationship: 
.2
1)(0)(
0


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
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W                                 (13) 
   Therefore, in view of equations (12) and (13), we summarize the results as the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 
Regardless of the types of consumer expectations, if the strength of a network externality 
is larger (smaller) than a half, i.e., ,2
1)(  the number of firms in the case of free 
entry is socially too low (high), based on the second-best criteria, i.e., ,)(* kk nn   
., rpk   
 
Thus, if the strength of a network externality is sufficiently large, the theorem does 
not holds in the case of Cournot oligopolistic competition with free entry. In view of 
equations (3) and (6), output per firm is higher in the case of positive network 
externalities, compared with that in the case of non-network externalities, i.e., ,0  
where the theorem holds. As a result, the number of firms under free entry is lower than 
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the socially second-best number of firms. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Although our model is very specific, e.g., linear functions, we have demonstrated that 
the presence of excess quantity competition and entry that is socially too low when 
significant network externalities exist. In addition to generalization of the model and 
analysis of the case of price competition, we should examine competition and entry 
policy in network industries. 
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